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Abstract
Acknowledging that wage inequality and intergenerational mobility
are strongly interrelated, this paper presents a model in which both
are jointly determined. The model enables us to study how inequality
and mobility are a¤ected by exogenous changes and what determines
their correlation. A main implication of the model is that di¤erences
in the amount of public subsidies to education and educational qual-
ity produce cross-country patterns with a negative correlation between
inequality and mobility. Di¤erences in the labor market, like di¤er-
ences in skill-biased technology or wage compression instead produce a
positive correlation. The predictions of the model are found to be con-
sistent with various empirical observations on mobility and inequality.
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic research on income inequality has expanded signicantly in
recent years. This interest in the distribution of income reects both its so-
cial importance and also a growing awareness among economists of its signif-
icant macroeconomic implications. In this paper we claim that inequality, in
particular wage inequality, should be analyzed jointly with intergenerational
mobility, since the two are strongly related. On the one hand inequality af-
fects mobility. A greater skill premium increases incentives for education
acquisition and thus raises upward mobility and reduces downward mobil-
ity. On the other hand, intergenerational mobility a¤ects the supplies of
skilled and unskilled and thus the returns to skill and wage inequality. This
paper studies the general equilibrium determination of both.
The joint analysis of inequality and mobility is also important for a
welfare analysis. The utility of an individual depends on her current income,
but also on the chances of herself or her children to change income in the
future. Indirectly, individuals therefore care about future rates of social
mobility since high mobility means that a shock to the income of a dynasty
is less persistent. In order to capture this, the model assumes that parents
derive utility from the utility of their children. This enables the model
to analyze how various policies a¤ect welfare through both inequality and
mobility.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, our joint analysis of inequality
and mobility can help in understanding various empirical ndings. Our
model predicts that di¤erences in labor markets across countries lead to a
positive correlation between inequality and mobility. If countries with high
inequality also have high mobility, our model predicts that the main driving
force behind these di¤erences is to be found at the labor market, e.g., dif-
ferent skill-bias in their industries or di¤erent labor market institutions. If
instead a negative correlation is found, the main di¤erence is in the educa-
tion system, e.g., the quality and general availability of public education.
Thus, our model can contribute to understanding the underlying reasons for
di¤erences across countries in inequality and mobility.
Let us now describe the main ingredients of our model. Workers can
be either skilled or unskilled and we use the ratio between their wages as a
measure of inequality. This measure is endogenously determined in general
equilibrium as a function of the relative supplies of skilled and unskilled.
Skill is acquired through education. We assume that parents cannot borrow
against the future income of their children and hence must nance education
from their income only. The amount of education needed to become skilled
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di¤ers both by the childs innate ability and by the parents education.
The ability of an individual is stochastic and is independent of parental
ability. However, we assume that skilled parents have an advantage over
unskilled parents in providing education for their children. For example,
skilled parents have better knowledge of what books to buy, which tutors to
hire, or may provide a home environment more suitable for education. As a
result, success in education depends not only on ability but also on income
of parents as well as on their education.
We assume that parents know the educational ability of their children.
They allocate income between their own consumption and their childs ed-
ucation and that determines an ability threshold above which children be-
come skilled. These thresholds dene the probabilities of becoming skilled
and unskilled for children of various backgrounds. The probabilities describe
intergenerational mobility in our model. The main variable we focus on is
the probability of a child of unskilled to become skilled, which is the rate of
upward mobility. We use it as our main measure of mobility.
The equilibrium is analyzed by looking at two relationships between
inequality and mobility. The rst describes how inequality a¤ects the in-
vestment in education and thus the rate of upward mobility. We identify
two potential and opposite e¤ects here. On the one hand, higher inequality
increases the gains from education. This strengthens the incentive to invest
in education and increases upward mobility. We call this the incentive e¤ect.
On the other hand, higher inequality reduces the ability of unskilled parents
to pay for education costs that are indexed to skilled wage, like teachers
salaries. We call this negative e¤ect of inequality on mobility the distance
e¤ect. Note that even if all educational costs are indexed to unskilled wage,
like foregone income, higher inequality still reduces the relative ability of
unskilled to pay for education. Namely, the di¤erence in educational at-
tainment between children with di¤erent social backgrounds might increase
with inequality.
The second equilibrium relationship reects the e¤ect of mobility on
inequality through the production sector and the labor market. Higher
mobility increases the net ow from unskilled to skilled and reduces the
number of unskilled in the long run. This raises their wage, so it reduces
inequality. Hence, this creates a negative relationship between mobility and
inequality.
The interaction of these two relationships determines the equilibrium.
We then look at the e¤ect of various exogenous changes and divide them to
two types: changes in the production sector and changes in the education
sector. Changes in the production sector tend to shift inequality and mo-
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bility in the same direction. Intuitively, such changes a¤ect the returns to
factors of production and thus a¤ect inequality. Increased inequality tends
to raise mobility through the incentive e¤ect and hence the correlation is
positive. Changes in the education sector usually lead to a negative cor-
relation between inequality and mobility. Such changes increase access to
education and thus increase mobility. That reduces the number of unskilled
workers, which reduces inequality. Hence, the two variables are negatively
related under such changes.
The paper then focuses on a public education, which is modeled as a
subsidy to education. Similar to other improvements in education, a public
subsidy reduces inequality and increases upward mobility. As in Fernandez
and Rogerson (1995), skilled parents have an advantage in capturing the
subsidy since they, on average, educate their children more. The direct
e¤ect of subsidies is therefore to increase the di¤erence between educational
attainment of children of skilled and of unskilled. However, in addition to
previous literature, we also consider the general equilibrium e¤ect of the
subsidy on wage inequality, through the increase in supply of skill. The
lower wage inequality reduces the di¤erence in education attainment between
the two classes. Furthermore, we show that the indirect e¤ect may very
well dominate the direct one and the long-run result of public education is
a reduction of the di¤erence in education attainment between children of
skilled and of unskilled, unlike previous results in the literature.
Although measuring intergenerational mobility is hard, due to data lim-
itations, empirical research in the area has been growing recently, as more
longitudinal data is being accumulated. We use this research to examine
whether the predictions of our model are supported by the data and we
nd signicant support to it. Checchi et al (1999) nd that Italy is more
equal but less mobile than the US. Indeed, the fact that Italy has labor
market policies which signicantly compress wages relative to the US, ts
this positive correlation between inequality and mobility according to our
model. Björklund et. al (2001) and Blanden et. al (2005) nd that Nordic
countries and Canada are more equal and more mobile than the US and
UK. Indeed, we show that public education is much larger in these countries
than in US and UK, which should lead according to our model to a negative
correlation between inequality and mobility. Dahan and Gaviria (2003) nd
that Latin American countries are both less equal and less mobile than the
US. According to our model this hints at higher public education in the US,
which is found to be the case. We discuss other empirical ndings as well
and they are largely in line with the predictions of our model.
This paper contributes to a growing literature that brings inequality
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and mobility into macroeconomics. This literature has been spurred by the
recent widening of wage gaps, and by recent ndings that income distri-
bution matters for the overall economy. This point has been made both
theoretically, by Loury (1981), Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and New-
man (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), and others, and empirically by
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996)
and Barro (2000). Intergenerational mobility has recently been studied by
Galor and Tsiddon (1997), Owen and Weil (1998), Fernandez and Roger-
son (1998), Maoz and Moav (1999), Hassler and Rodríguez Mora (2000),
Benabou (2001) and Solon (2004). These studies focus mainly on the dy-
namics of inequality and mobility and their relation to economic growth.
Recent papers, which focus on public education, are Glomm and Raviku-
mar (1992), Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), Benabou (2002) and Fender
and Wang (2003).1
When placing our paper within this literature we wish to emphasize three
important features of our model. The rst is the question it raises. While
most other papers discuss the evolution of inequality over time, our paper
focuses on cross country di¤erences in inequality and mobility and enables
us to draw empirical implications. The second special element of this model
is the feedback from labor supplies to wage inequality. Most papers on
inequality and mobility study how wage levels a¤ect skill acquisition. Few,
however, allow the supplies of skilled and unskilled labor to a¤ect wages
in general equilibrium on the labor market.2 The third special ingredient
is the modeling of the intertemporal link within a dynasty by assuming
that parents care about their o¤springs utility as in a Barro type model.
Sharing formulation with the standard neoclassical macroeconomic model is
an advantage in itself. More importantly, it adds new insights and results
since it allows for the intuitive idea that people care about inequality and
mobility both current and future. These are the three special ingredients of
our model, and although each appears in some papers, the integration of all
three elements into a unied theory of inequality and mobility has not been
done previously.3
1Related are also two papers that deal with child labor and education policy: Baland
and Robinson (2000) and Doepke and Zilibotti (2005).
2Exceptions are Galor and Zeira (1993), Owen and Weil (1998) and Maoz and Moav
(1999).
3A cost of our approach is that we cannot analytically solve for the dynamics around
the steady state. We are also aware of the discussion about whether bequest incentives
arise from the o¤springs utility or from the "warm glow of giving". See, e.g., Altonji, et
al. (1997). However, in our model parents directly nance the education of their children,
in which case it is more reasonable to use the utilitarian assumption rather than the
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and
Section 3 describes the steady state equilibrium. Section 4 studies the com-
parative statics of the equilibrium while Section 5 analyzes the e¤ects of
public subsidies to education. Section 6 is devoted to an empirical discus-
sion and Section 7 summarizes. The appendix contains some proofs and an
analysis of the case of no information on innate ability.
2 The Model
Consider an economy that consists of two-period overlapping generations
with no population growth. Each person has one child, and each generation
is a continuum of unitary measure. Individuals are born unskilled and in
the rst period of life they can acquire education and become skilled.
In the second period of life individuals supply inelastically one unit of
labor, earning as skilled ws or wn as unskilled. They consume and invest
in the education of their child, deriving utility both from own consumption
and from the expected utility of their o¤spring. Parental utility is:
ln c+ Voff ;
where c is own consumption, Voff is expected utility of o¤spring, and  2
(0; 1) is the intergenerational discount factor.
For wage determination we turn to describe production in the economy.
There is one nal good in the economy, which is produced with skilled and
unskilled labor:
Y = F (a;N; S)
where N and S are the inputs of unskilled and skilled labor respectively, F
is a standard quasi-concave CRS production function of N and S, and a is
a productivity parameter, which is assumed to a¤ect skilled more than un-
skilled, as becomes clear below. Labor markets are competitive and hence
wages are equal to their respective marginal productivities. The skilled
wages is ws = FS (a;N; S) = FS (a; n; 1), where n  N=S is the relative sup-
ply of unskilled workers. Similarly the unskilled wages is wn = FN (a; n; 1).
Hence, the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages, which is our measure of wage
inequality and is denoted I, satises:
I  ws
wn
=
FS (a; n; 1)
FN (a; n; 1)
= I (a; n) :
alternative.
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Due to quasi-concavity and CRS of the production function I is an in-
creasing function of n: We can therefore write the inverse relation, namely
how the labor supplies t the equilibrium wage inequality, in the following
way:
n = n (I; a) : (1)
We also assume that the range of I includes levels of inequality both
above and below unity, or formally, that lim n!0I (a; n) < 1 and lim n!1I (a; n) >
1 for all relevant a0s:
As stated above, the productivity parameter a is assumed to be skill-
biased. We formally assume that the elasticity of FS with respect to a is
larger than the elasticity of FN with respect to a. This therefore means that
Ia > 0, and also na < 0.
In most of the analysis in this paper, we use a CES specication of the
production function
Y =

N
 1
 + a
1
S
 1

 
 1
; (2)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and non-skilled labor.
In this case wage inequality is described by the following function:
I = (an)
1
 :
We next describe education acquisition. Children di¤er in the amount of
education they need to become skilled, both due to di¤erent innate abilities
to learn and to di¤erences in parental education. The (inverse) measure of
innate ability is inaptitude.It is the amount of education a child needs to
become skilled if born to a skilled parent. We denote inaptitude by e and
assume that it is random, independent across families and over time, and
distributed uniformly on [0; 1]. As we assume that educated parents help
their children in non-pecuniary ways in addition to paying for education,
children of unskilled parents face an educational barrier relative to children
of skilled parents. A child with inaptitude e of an unskilled parent needs
be units of education to become skilled, where b  1. The barrier b reects
many factors, social, cultural, and even technological.
The cost of one unit of education is assumed to be proportional to the
unskilled wage, namely it is wnh , where h parameterizes the productivity of
the educational sector. This assumption is a short-cut for a more detailed
description of the educational production process, where a signicant part
of the cost is the opportunity cost of student time, which is proportional
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to the unskilled wage. We believe this assumption provides a reasonable
base line despite the fact that, literally, we do not have an opportunity
cost of education in our model. However, we have analyzed the case where
education costs are indexed to skilled wages, nding similar results, except
for very high inequality levels. We return to these issues below.
Capital markets are imperfect. We assume that neither the parent nor
the child can borrow to nance education and that dynasties can not accu-
mulate wealth in order to nance education.4 As a result, parents pay for
education out of their income. We assume rst that education is a private
good, and introduce public education in Section 5. Regarding the informa-
tion structure of the model, we assume that the education decision is made
after the childs inaptitude is revealed. Then the parent decides whether or
not to spend the amount on education required to make the child skilled.
In Appendix 2 we consider the case when the educational decision is taken
before information on inaptitude is revealed. In this case an interesting
bargaining situation emerges between parent and o¤spring, and as a result,
intrafamily relations have an e¤ect on inequality and mobility.
3 Equilibrium
The decision to invest in the childs education depends on the cost of edu-
cation on the one hand and on the expected gains from education for the
child on the other hand. Note that the inaptitude of the child is already
known, so the expectation of gains refers to the yet unknown inaptitude of
the grandchild and other future descendants. These gains depend of course
on future wages for skilled and unskilled. To simplify the analysis we focus
in the paper on the steady state. Hence the expected utilities of skilled
and unskilled are not time dependent and we denote them by Vs and Vn
respectively, noting that these values are calculated before the aptitude of
the child is revealed.
Suppose a parent with wage w has a child for whom it costs x to become
educated. The parent can decide to pay x and have a skilled o¤spring or to
4There can be many reasons for the existence of the borrowing constraint. The main
one is the inability to dene property rights, namely to commit the o¤spring to return
loans taken by the parents. In fact, a perfect market in our model would require that a
person must be able to commit his descendents in any future generation. The inability
to accumulate wealth is more restrictive and done to keep the analysis tractable. See also
next footnote.
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abstain and keep the o¤spring unskilled.5 Education is chosen if
ln(w   x) + Vs  lnw + Vn:
Subtracting ln (w) from both sides we can derive a maximum share of
the wage that a parent would pay to make her child skilled. We denote this
maximum by m and note that it is determined by
  ln(1 m)

= Vs   Vn: (3)
Hence, the log specication of utility implies that m is equal for skilled and
unskilled and depends only on the expected gains from education, namely
on the RHS of (3).
Given a value ofm; wages and the cost of education, we can now calculate
threshold levels of inaptitude for children of skilled and non-skilled such
that if the inaptitude e is below this threshold, the parent will pay for her
becoming skilled. The threshold level for children of skilled is:
es = hmI (4)
and similarly, the education threshold for children of unskilled is:6
en =
hm
b
: (5)
The thresholds in equations (4) and (5) are computed for a given level of m:
This level will be determined by the optimal choices of parents, as implicitly
given by (3). As we will see shortly, this implies that m will be a monotone
increasing function of I.
Note that given our distributional assumptions on e, the thresholds es
and en are the shares of children from skilled and non-skilled homes, respec-
tively, who become skilled. Hence, 1 es and en are measures for downward
and upward mobility, respectively. As we see, es  en for two reasons. First,
there is the direct social disadvantage if b > 1: Second, the income di¤erence
5Note that to keep the analysis tractable, we assume that a parent pays only to the
childs education and is not allowed to leave an additional pecuniary bequest. It can
be shown that this assumption is not needed and people do not leave an additional be-
quest if the steady state inequality satises: I(1   ) > 1=h, which is in line with our
parameterization below.
6 If hmI  1, then es = 1 in a corner solution and all children of skilled become skilled
themselves. As shown later this is impossible in the steady state.
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a¤ects the ability to pay for education. If I > 1 and b > 1; there is thus a
double relative handicap for children of non-skilled.
We next turn to calculate the expected gains from education, Vs   Vn,
using the above threshold levels and the common value of m. The expected
utility of skilled, before their childs inaptitude becomes known, is
Vs =
esZ
0
ln

ws   ewn
h

de+
1Z
es
lnwsde+ Vn + es (Vs   Vn) : (6)
The last term represents the expected additional utility a skilled person gets
from the possibility that her child will become skilled. Calculating Vn in the
same way and taking the di¤erence yields
Vs   Vn =
ln I +
esR
0
ln
 
1  eIh

de 
enR
0
ln
 
1  e bh

de
1   (es   en) :
As seen from this equation the gains from education include a direct income
e¤ect, as education raises income of the child, and an indirect e¤ect , as
an educated child will be able to provide more education to her child, by
avoiding the educational barrier.
Using the common value of m and evaluating the integrals7, we can
express the gains from education as
Vs   Vn =
ln I + h
 
I   1b

(  (1 m) ln (1 m) m)
1  h  I   1bm : (7)
When m = 0; the gains from education are equal to ln I. As m rises and
parents invest more in education, the gains from education may rise or
decline.
7Note that
esR
0
ln
 
1  e
Ih

de =   (Ih  es) ln
 
1  es
Ih
  es:
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Vs-Vn
Figure 1. Incentive and gain from education for given wage
inequality.
Equations (3) and (7) describe two relationships between the gains to
education and m. Equation (3) describes how m depends on the gains
from education and is drawn in Figure 1 as the monotonically upward slop-
ing Incentive curve. Equation (7) describes, instead, how the gains from
education depend on maximum educational spending m, and is drawn in
Figure 1 as the Gain curve. The intersection of the two curves determines
the steady state level of maximum spending on education m. Note that
the denominator of the RHS of (7) is strictly positive since h
 
I   1b

m
=  (es   en) < 1: In Figure 1 we draw the two curves for the values
I = 1:55; h = 4; b = 1:1;  = 14 . In this example m is 0:107 and conse-
quently, es = 0:663 and en = 0:389:
The intersection of the incentive curve and the gain curve in Figure 1
can be analytically characterized by the following equation, which is derived
from equating the LHS of (3) and the RHS of (7):
  ln (1 m)

= ln I + h

I   1
b

(  ln (1 m) m) : (8)
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This equation, which implicitly describes how the maximum investment in
education depends on inequality, is analyzed in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1:
For a given I; let m (I) denote a solution to (8) such that es 2 [0; 1]. It
can then be established that:
1. m (I) exists for a non-degenerate domain I 2 [1; Imax].
2. m(I) is unique.
3. m(I) is continuous and strictly increasing with m (1) = 0:
Proof in Appendix 1.
According to Proposition 1 the maximum steady state spending on edu-
cation m depends positively on inequality I. Hence, upward mobility, which
is:
en =M(I)  h
b
m (I)
also depends positively on inequality. This is the incentive e¤ect. It reects
how higher inequality increases the gains from education, increases the max-
imum spending on education and thus increases upward mobility. Note also
that inequality reduces downward mobility, since 1  es = 1  hm (I) I.
Clearly, income inequality and mobility are also related in the reverse
direction, through the labor market. Mobility changes the supplies of skilled
and unskilled, their wages and as a result wage inequality. To analyze it we
focus on the steady state, in which the upward ow of children of unskilled,
who acquire education, must equal the downward ow of children of skilled,
who do not get education. The steady state must satisfy:
enN = (1  es)S: (9)
We next show that our assumptions imply that the upward and down-
ward ows in the steady state are strictly positive. First note that es < 1.
Otherwise, by (9) either N = 0 or en = 0: In the rst case, n = 0 and since
we have assumed lim n!0I (a; n) < 1; this is inconsistent with es = 1 since
no one should become skilled when I  1: Alternatively, if en = 0; if follows
from (4) and (5) that es = 0 as well, contradicting the initial assumption
es = 1. Similarly, en = es = 0 cannot be a steady state equilibrium, since
then (9) implies that S = 0, and since lim n!1I (a; n) > 1 this is incon-
sistent with no parent choosing to make her child skilled. We therefore
conclude that the steady state must satisfy I > 1 and 0 < en < es < 1:
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In addition to the steady state ow restriction in (9), the relation between
inequality and the ratio of non-skilled to skilled is determined at the labor
market by (1). Substituting this equation, together with (4) and (5) in
equation (9), we get the following equilibrium condition:
en =
1
n (I; a) + Ib
 L (I) : (10)
The function L (I) denotes the labor market relation between mobility
and inequality, whereby mobility a¤ects the distribution of workers and thus
wage inequality. It is clear from equation (10) that L(I) is decreasing. Intu-
itively, there are two reasons for that. First, higher inequality implies that
the supply of skilled is smaller and the supply of unskilled is larger. Hence,
for the same mobility rates the upward ow increases and the downward
ow decreases. To restore equality of the two ows, so that equation (9)
holds, upward mobility must decline and downward mobility must rise. The
second reason is due to do the di¤erence between educational attainments
of children of skilled and unskilled. If inequality rises, downward mobility
declines for a given level of upward mobility as the skilled can pay more for
education. To restore equality of up and down ows, upward mobility must
decline. Hence, these two mechanisms lead to a negative e¤ect of inequality
on upward mobility, as described by the function L.
Our model is now fully solved and we depict the two equilibrium condi-
tions in Figure 2, under the previous specications.8 The downward sloping
curve represents en = L (I) and the upward sloping en = M (I) : At the
crossing, the labor market is in a steady state equilibrium where educational
decisions are taken optimally.
8The parameters used here and in the following graphs unless otherwise stated are
a = 2:5; b = 1:1; h = 4;and  = 0:25. Following Hornstein and Krusell (2003), we set
 = 1:67:
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Figure 2. Steady state equilibrium. en = L (I) and en =M (I)
Proposition 2:
There is a unique steady state equilibrium in the model, satisfying en =
L (I) =M (I) . The steady state wage inequality satises 1 < I < Imax and
en < (bImax)
 1.
Proof: To establish the proposition, we note that
1. L0 < 0 and M 0 > 0,
2. M (1) = 0 and L (1) = 1n(1;a)+b > 0; and
3. M (Imax) = 1Imaxb >
1
n(Imax;a)+Imaxb
= L (Imax) :
4 Comparative statics
This section contains a comparative statics analysis of the steady state.
In general such an analysis can be interpreted in two possible ways: as
explaining cross-country di¤erences and as explaining changes within the
same country over time.
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4.1 Changes in the Production Sector
In this sub-section we turn to examine exogenous changes in the production
sector. We rst analyze the case of skill-biased-technical-change (SBTC),
being a topic of much research recently. As already noted, such a change
is described by a shift of the parameter a in the production function. Note
that such a change has no direct e¤ect on the function relating parental
educational decisions to inequality. Thus, an increase in a has no e¤ect on
the M curve. However, an increase in a shifts the L curve up and to the
right. As a result, inequality I increases, upward mobility increases and the
maximum share of income spent on education m rises as well.
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
I
en
L(I)
M(I)
Figure 3. Skill-technical bias, a; increases from 2.5 (solid line) to 3
(dotted line).
Another type of change, which is usually more related to di¤erences
across countries, and that has a similar e¤ect as a negative SBTC, is wage
compression. A country with much labor regulation or strong labor unions
tends to have more compressed wages. In our model this can be described as
having a lower a. Hence, such a country experiences lower wage inequality
and since only the L (I) curve shifts inwards, upward mobility must be lower
as well.
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4.2 Changes in the Education Sector
In this section we turn to examine how changes in the education sector
a¤ect the steady state equilibrium levels of inequality and mobility. More
specically, we examine the e¤ects of changes in the parameters h and b on
the steady state equilibrium, where h is the overall productivity of education,
and b describes the sociocultural barriers to education faced by children of
unskilled parents.
Intuitively, improvements in the productivity of education should lead
to higher mobility and lower inequality. Better education enables children
of unskilled to acquire more education for their money, so that more of them
become skilled. Hence, upward mobility increases. As better education in-
creases the number of skilled and reduces the number of unskilled, inequality
falls. However, this intuitive argument does not take into account general
equilibrium e¤ects. We therefore turn to a formal analysis of changes in h
and b.
Consider rst an increase in the overall productivity of education h.
First, for any given m, upward mobility, which is equal to hmb 1, increases.
Second, for any given inequality I, maximum spending on education m
increases as well, because a rise in h increases the gains from education.
The reason for this is that part of the gains from education of a child is the
higher probability of the grandchild to go to school. Since this probability
increases if education is less costly, it increases the gains from education
and m, as seen in equation (8). The two e¤ects together shift the M curve
upward, as shown in Figure 4.
When education is more productive, the L (I) curve remains unchanged,
as seen in equation (10). The intuition is simple: upward mobility and
downward mobility change together when education becomes more e¢ cient.
Thus, for the same level of upward mobility the distribution of skill is un-
changed and so is I. Hence, the economy moves along the L (I) curve in
Figure 4 to the left: inequality falls and upward mobility rises. Note, that
the e¤ect on investment in education m is ambiguous. Lower inequality re-
duces the gains from education, which mitigates the positive e¤ect described
above.
15
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
I
en
L(I)
M(I)
Figure 4. Better education, h increases from 4 (solid line) to 4.5
(dotted line).
We next examine the e¤ect of a reduction of the educational barrier to
children of unskilled, b. The direct e¤ect of a reduction in b is to increase
upward mobility. However, there are also indirect e¤ects. Consider rst the
educational choice. In equation (8) we see that a reduction in b reduces the
maximum spending on education m. The intuitive explanation is that part
of the gain from education is that an educated person has an advantage over
an uneducated in providing education for her o¤spring, even when income
is controlled for. A lower b reduces this part of the gain from education.
However, it can be shown that the indirect e¤ect never overturns the rst.9
Thus, a reduction in the educational barrier leads to an upward shift of the
M (I) curve. A reduction in b also shifts the L curve upward and to the right.
Formally, this is clear from equation (10). Intuitively, if the social barrier b
is reduced, then for upward mobility en to remain unchanged, the maximum
investment in education m must be lower. Hence, while upward mobility
9To see this, note that
den
db
jen=M(I) =
h
b
m
b

dm
db
b
m
  1

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remains unchanged, downward mobility increases due to the reduction in
m. This increases the supply of unskilled and increases, as a result, wage
inequality I. This is why the L curve shifts to the right. The fact that
both M and L curves shift upward implies that mobility increases. The
e¤ect on inequality appears ambiguous from the diagrammatic analysis but
the following proposition shows that at least under the CES production
function the reduction in b reduces inequality.
Proposition 3: Under the CES assumption (2), a reduction in the
education barrier b raises mobility en and reduces inequality I.
Proof: In appendix
We can therefore summarize this section by noting that the correlation
between changes in inequality and in mobility depends on the underlying
causes for the changes. Changes in the production technology or the la-
bor market lead to mobility and inequality moving in the same direction.
Changes in the educational system, like changes in educational productivity
or barriers faced by the unskilled, lead to mobility and inequality moving in
opposite directions.
4.3 Education Costs Indexed to Skilled Wage
At this point, we would like to return to the assumption that educational
costs are mainly opportunity costs, and thus indexed to the non-skilled
wage.10
If this assumption is changed and instead the cost of education is indexed
to the skilled wage, the main change is that the slope of the M curve, now
described byM (I) = hm (I) (bI) 1, might become negative at high levels of
inequality I. The reason for that is that as inequality increases, it becomes
where dm
db
is calculated under (8). Furthermore,
dm
db
b
m
=
hm
b
(1 m) (  ln (1 m) m)
m2

1

  h  I   1
b

m

<
en
1

  (es   en)
(1 m) (  ln (1 m) m)
m2
:
Finally,
en
1

  (es   en) =

1 +
1
en

1

  es
 1
< 1
and (1 m)(  ln(1 m) m)
m2
is decreasing from 1
2
in the range m 2 (0; 1) : Therefore,
den
db
jen=M(I) < 0:
10A formal analysis is available upon request.
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increasingly costly for unskilled parents to pay for their o¤springs education.
Eventually, this distance e¤ect might dominate and then the slope of theM
becomes negative. The conclusion, however, is that the model behaves in a
fairly similar way under this alternative assumption. The main di¤erence is
that at very high levels of inequality a skill-biased technical change might
lead to a reduction of mobility instead of higher mobility. But we should
note that this case appears less plausible for developed economies, requiring,
in particular, that the level of inequality at which the curveM changes slope
is smaller than Imax.
5 Public Subsidies to Education
This section introduces public support to education. This support can be
partial, so that some education costs are still privately nanced. Our as-
sumption in this section therefore di¤er from those in Glomm and Raviku-
mar (1992), where public education rules out private expenditures on edu-
cation. In our model public education helps parents increase the probability
of their children to become skilled by lowering the private cost of school-
ing. We assume that public education is nanced by a proportional tax on
income.
Intuitively, one may think that public education should lead to higher
mobility and lower inequality. Public education enables more children of
unskilled to go to school, thus raising upward mobility. It also increases
the number of skilled workers and reduces the number of unskilled, thus
lowering inequality. Indeed, these are usually the declared goals of increases
in public education. However, the analysis should take account of other
secondary e¤ects, which might reduce these primary e¤ects, and might even
harm the declared goals. In order to assess these opposing e¤ects we turn to
a formal analysis of public subsidies to education, which helps us examine
these issues within a general equilibrium framework.
Let p be a proportional subsidy to education, paid by a proportional
income tax T: To simplify calculation we assume that educational spending
is tax-deductible. Hence, a parent that spends a share m of gross income on
education consumes (1 T )(1 m)w and gets hm=(1 p) units of education
if unskilled and hmI=(1  p) units of education if skilled. Consequently,
en =
mh
b (1  p)
es =
mhI
1  p = enbI;
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and, as in the case of changes in h; the L (I) curve is una¤ected by changes
in p and T .
Note that public subsidies to education benet skilled parents by more
than unskilled in the sense that @es@p >
@en
@p , both because they use education
better, provided b > 1; and since they have a higher income. This point has
been made by Fernandez and Rogerson (1995). However, we have an ad-
ditional indirect e¤ect through wage inequality. Public education increases
the supply of skill, which reduces I and thus reduces the di¤erence es   en.
We show in a numerical example below that it is perfectly possible that
the indirect e¤ect dominates the direct e¤ect and that despite the double
handicap of unskilled parents they increase education attainment by more
than skilled parents in the long-run.
To analyze the long-run e¤ects of educational subsidies, we start by
analyzing the incentives to invest in education. First, note that since the
utility loss of taxes is additive, given by ln (1  T ) ; regardless of income and
the share spent on education, equation (3) is una¤ected.11 straightforward
calculation yields that (7) now becomes
Vs   Vn =
ln I +
 
I   1b

h
1 p (  (1 m) ln (1 m) m)
1   mh1 p
 
I   1b
 : (11)
An increase in p thus raises the gains from education and its e¤ect is iso-
morphic to an increase in h, the productivity of education.
We therefore conclude that inequality falls and upward mobility rises
with p. This result shows that the e¤ect of public education on mobility and
inequality is similar to the e¤ects of the other changes in the educational
sector, which are analyzed in subsection 4.2.
We next briey discuss some welfare aspects of public education. Specif-
ically, we examine who prefers more subsidies to education, the skilled or the
unskilled. One the one hand the unskilled gain more from the subsidy, since
it reduces inequality by raising their wage and since it increases mobility
and thus increases their childrens chance to escape from poverty. On the
other hand, the skilled can use the public subsidy to education better, since
they face a lower barrier to education.
In gure 5 we plot the welfare of skilled and unskilled as measured by Vs
and Vn;respectively, against p: In addition, we also plot aggregate welfare,
i.e., NVn + SVs: We use the same parameters as above.12
11Clearly, a progressive tax system a¤ects educational incentives directly.
12The budget constraint of the government is T =
p(e2s+(1 es)ben)
2h(n+I) (1 p)(e2s+(1 es)ben)
: Proof
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Figure 5. Welfare as a function of the subsidy rate p.
In Figure 5 we see that Vs is monotonically decreasing in p, while the
opposite is true for Vn. Public education a¤ects welfare via its e¤ect on
inequality and mobility and via the tax cost. The e¤ect of inequality is pos-
itive for the unskilled, since their wage rises and negative for the skilled since
their wage declines. The e¤ect through mobility is positive for both, since
public education reduces the chance that the child will become unskilled.
In Figure 5 we see that for the skilled, the inequality e¤ect dominates the
mobility e¤ect and they prefer to reduce public education as much as possi-
ble. The unskilled gain from public education both through inequality and
through mobility and despite the fact that they are less likely to get the
subsidy since fewer of their children get educated they prefer to have as
much subsidy as possible.
Figure 5 also shows that average welfare is maximized by a positive
subsidy rate. The social optimal subsidy of education is p = 0.751, which is
nanced by a proportional tax of 3.87%. Interestingly these gures are not
far from observed values.13 The e¤ect of this subsidy is to increase upward
and code to solve for the utility levels numerically are available upon request.
13The average share of public education in total education costs in OECD countries
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mobility from en = 0:393 to 0:557. Also es increases, but by less, from
es = 0:672 to 0:713: Therefore, the di¤erence in educational attainment,
es  en falls from 0:279 to 0:156; i.e., it is almost cut in half. The changes in
es and en increase the supply of skilled, causing wage inequality to fall from
1:554 to 1:165 and the wage of unskilled to increase by 21:4%:
The nding that unskilled and skilled have opposing views on public
subsidies remains also if the barrier to education is much higher. Setting
b = 3; for example, implies that mobility, with and without subsidies, is
very low. But, nevertheless, the unskilled still prefer 100% subsidies while
the skilled still prefer none. Interestingly, the welfare maximizing level of
subsidies is almost the same as in the low barrier case, it is p = 0:760: The
subsidy increases en from 0:170 to 0:246 and es from 0:843 to 0:870. Also in
this case es   en falls, now from 0:673 to 0:624: Inequality falls from 1:649
to 1:181 and the wage of unskilled increases by 24:9%:
6 Empirical Implications
A main message of our theoretical model is that di¤erences in the educa-
tional system tend to generate a negative association between inequality and
mobility, while di¤erences in the labor market tend to generate a positive
association between them. As a result we can use observations on di¤erences
in wage inequality and intergenerational mobility in order to learn which un-
derlying changes caused them. In this section we review some international
comparisons of inequality and mobility and show that their correlations are
in line with the predictions of the model. Measuring wage inequality, e.g.,
the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages is relatively simple, though the de-
nition of skill might di¤er across countries. Measuring intergenerational
mobility is more di¢ cult due to lack of su¢ cient data that go back to past
generations. As a result not many studies have produced internationally
comparable measures. One of these few studies is Blanden et al (2005), ex-
tending work by Björklund et al (2002). They provide measures of mobility,
based on intergenerational correlation of income between fathers and sons,
for UK, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, US and West Ger-
many. They nd that Canada and the Nordic countries have relatively high
degrees of mobility, Britain and the US have substantially lower mobility,
while Germany is an intermediate case. In Figure 6 we plot the reported
levels of mobility, measured as 1 minus the intergenerational partial corre-
is 0:884 and the average public education costs as a share of GDP in these countries is
4:96%. Source: OECD in Figures - 2005 Edition. Table "Education expenditures".
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lation coe¢ cient, against measures of wage inequality. In the upper panel,
we use the college education wage gap, taken from the "OECD Education
at a glance 2002". In the lower panel, we instead use the log wage di¤erence
between the 90th and the 10th wage decile as reported by Blau and Kahn
(1996).14 As we see, the general pattern here is a negative relation between
inequality and mobility. This is largely driven by the di¤erence between,
on the one hand, the U.S. and U.K., with high inequality and low mobil-
ity and on the other, the northern European countries and Canada, where
inequality is low and mobility is high. This pattern remains also if other
measures of inequality reported in Blau and Kahn (1996) are used. For dif-
ferences within the group of European countries and Canada, however, such
a negative relation is not clearly visible, an observation we will return to
below.
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14Canada and Finland are not included in the data from Blau and Kahn.
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Figure 6. Mobility vs. inequality.
Applying our model to the correlations shown in the two graphs leads
to a clear conclusion. The main di¤erence between the US and UK and the
Northern European countries and Canada lies in the area of education. De-
spite other possible di¤erences like wage compression in Europe, emphasized
by Blau and Kahn (1996) and further discussed below, our interpretation is
that di¤erences in the educational systems must play a more prominent role,
given the observed di¤erences in mobility and inequality. There is support
in the data for this interpretation. In Canada and in the Scandinavian coun-
tries, government subsidies to higher education are substantially higher than
in the U.S. and the U.K. In Table 1, we report public spending on tertiary
education. The average public spending in Canada and the Scandinavian
countries is almost twice as high as in the U.K. and the U.S. (2.03 % vs.
1.17%) and even higher relative to the Mediterranean countries, which we
will return to below.15 We also note that public expenditures on tertiary
education are low in Germany, despite a fairly low level of inequality and
a fairly high level of mobility, a fact less easy to explain with our model.
However, the fact that the German educational system stands out by relying
heavily on apprenticeships makes Germany a special case. More than half
15The Scandinavian countries and Canada also spend a larger share of GDP on education
below the tertiary level, although this is arguably less relevant in the perspective of our
model.
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the cohort of young individuals participate in the apprenticeships system
including also a substantial share of individuals that later get a tertiary ed-
ucation (the "double qualication strategy"), see Ryan (2001). A possible
interpretation is that the German society as a whole spends a substantial
amount of resources on education of high quality provided on an equal op-
portunity basis, despite a relatively small amount of subsidies channeled
directly via the public budget.
Table 1
Public Spending on Tertiary Education
Average share of GDP
1997-2003
Norway 1.96%
Sweden 2.04%
Canada 1.73%
Finland 2.02%
Denmark 2.38%
Germany 1.11%
U.K. 0.96%
U.S. 1.38%
Italy 0.78%
Spain 0.93%
Portugal 0.98%
Ireland 1.41%
Greece 0.85%
Source: OECD.stat webpage
(http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/)
We next turn to another group of countries, mainly from Southern Eu-
rope. Measures of mobility for these countries are scarce, but recently Comi
(2003) used the European Community Household panel to derive such mea-
sures. Despite some problems with this dataset, in particular that sons
earnings are measured at a rather early age, it has the clear advantage that
the data are collected in a similar way across all countries. The ndings
of Comi are that the Mediterranean countries, Portugal and Ireland have
a relatively low degree of intergenerational mobility. Comi (2003) nds no
systematic evidence that the low degree of mobility in these countries is
correlated with the educational wage premia. Hence, mobility in Southern
Europe is lower than in Northern Europe, while inequality is quite similar
in the two regions. Such a cross-country di¤erence is not along the diagonal
in the mobility/inequality diagram and thus requires more than one di¤er-
ence between the two group of countries. One of the di¤erences between
Northern and Southern Europe is that the former spend much more pub-
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lic resources on higher education, as seen in table 1. By itself, this would
lead to higher mobility in the north, but also lower inequality. We observe
the former, but not the latter. We argue that the remaining di¤erence is
that wage compression is much more important in Southern Europe than in
Northern.
Wage compression, i.e., that wages di¤er less than individual produc-
tivities, is obviously an impossibility when labor and product markets are
perfect. However, perfect markets, particularly in Europe, is not a good
description of reality. Minimum wages, collective bargaining, employment
protection legislation, search frictions and legal and other entry barriers are
some features of European labor and product markets that create the pos-
sibility that wages deviate from marginal productivities. Measuring cross-
country di¤erences in wage compression is not a simple task and we cannot
claim that the evidence is completely conclusive. However, evidence sup-
porting the idea that wage compression is more important in Southern than
in Northern Europe does exist. Mourre (2005) uses the European Unions
Structure of Earnings Survey 2002. Using a standard CES production func-
tion, it is shown that a wage compression coe¢ cient can be identied by
separately estimating a standard labor demand equation and an equation for
the relative labor demand as a function of relative wages. The nding is that
wage compression is large in EU as a whole relative wages are compressed
by between a fth and a quarter. More importantly, while strong and signif-
icant evidence for wage compression is found for continental and Southern
Europe, no signicant wage compression is found for northern EU countries
(Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands) nor for the Anglo-Saxon
countries (Ireland and the UK). This results is perhaps surprising given the
long history of strong unions and centralized bargaining in Scandinavia. It
should be noted, however, that the so called "solidaric wage policy" pursued
by Scandinavian labor unions aimed at reducing horizontal rather than ver-
tical wage di¤erences (see e.g., Agell and Lommerud, 1993). The idea was
that by demanding "equal pay for equal jobs", structural change, i.e., an
expansion/contraction of sectors/rms with high/low productivity, could be
speeded up. To the extent that this policy was successful, it would create
wage compression between individuals with similar characteristics, i.e., re-
duce the variance of the wage residual, rather than compressing the college
premium or other measures of vertical wage inequality. Another observa-
tion, consistent with this, is that the incidence of long-term unemployment
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is much higher in Southern than in Northern Europe.16
These empirical ndings mean that the countries in Northern Europe
di¤er from the countries in Southern Europe in two main aspects relevant
to our theory. Northern Europe has more public education than the South,
and has less wage compression in the labor market. The rst di¤erence
should lead to higher mobility and more equality in Northern Europe. The
second di¤erence should lead to less equality but more mobility in Northern
Europe. Indeed, the data show that Northern Europe is much more mobile
than Southern Europe. Since the two di¤erences a¤ect inequality in two
opposite ways it is not surprising that in reality inequality is found to be
similar in the North and the South of Europe. Hence, this relationship also
ts our model fairly well.
Checchi et al (1999) provide further empirical evidence to this conclu-
sion. They compare mobility and inequality in Italy and in the US and nd
that while mobility in Italy is lower than in the US, also inequality is much
lower than in the US. According to our model, the positive correlation be-
tween mobility and inequality when comparing Italy and the US, points to
di¤erences in the labor market. As discussed above, the evidence in Mourre
(2005) is that wage compression is high in Southern Europe. Furthermore,
comparing the U.S. and Europe, Blau and Kahn (1996, 2002), show that
labor market regulation created signicant wage compression in European
countries compared to the US and the UK. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)
have also shown that the higher unemployment in Europe is due to labor reg-
ulations, like generous unemployment benets, high minimum wages, high
ring costs, and more. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) have shown
that such labor market regulations have reduced hours worked in Europe
relative to the US. More specically, Erikson and Ichino (1994) document
an extreme compressionof wages in Italy during the 1970s.
Another international comparison of intergenerational mobility appears
in Dahan and Gaviria (2001). They study 16 Latin American countries and
compare them to the U.S. In order to overcome data limitations this paper
develops an interesting measure to mobility which happens to be close in
spirit to this paper. They measure it by sibling correlations of success and
failure in the schooling system. Dahan and Gaviria nd that within the
Latin American countries and even more so relative to the US, inequality
and mobility are negatively correlated. Thus, the average Gini coe¢ cient
16The average share of unemployed with an unemployment duration over a year in for
the years 2000-2006 was 19% in Scandinavia, 10% in the US, 24% in the U.K, but as large
as 57% in Italy. Source: OECD.stat webpage. (http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/)
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in the Latin American countries is .51 while it is .379 in the US. Mobility
(1 sibling coe¢ cient) is .505 in the Latin American countries while it is
equal to .797 in the US. This negative correlation points at di¤erences in
the education system between the two regions. Indeed, comparing the public
expendituresshare of GDP relative to the percentage of children in the two
regions (which is a proxy for what is called p in the model) we get that
the public support to education in the US is much larger. This gure is
.248 in the US, while it is only .109 in the 16 Latin American countries,
namely higher by a factor of two and a half. Hence, higher public support
to education in the US relative to Latin America comes with higher mobility
and lower inequality, as the model predicts.
We conclude this section with a few observations on changes in mobility
and inequality over time. Empirical comparisons of mobility over time are
very rare, as mobility measurements are rather new and it is hard to nd
data for past generations. One exception is Prandy et al (2007), who use
a host of data sets on mobility. Most of these data sets are fairly recent,
from the Post War period. But they also add a unique historical data
set from the Cambridge Family History Study. This data set consists of
people who traced their family history back in time over a long period of
time, of more than two centuries. This is of course not a sample, but it
supplies signicant information on the dynamics of mobility in Britain. As
mentioned above, the authors use more data sets for recent periods. The
way they measure mobility is occupational, which ts the spirit of our paper
well. They measure occupational correlation between father and child. The
pattern the study nds, as presented in Figure 1 in that paper, is that
mobility in Britain has been on a steady but very slow and gradual rise in
the last two centuries. Interestingly, since the 1970s mobility began to rise
much more rapidly. This result is interesting since 1972 is an important
year in the history of public education in the UK. In that year compulsory
education was extended to the age of 16 from an age of 12. Although there
was a mechanism that enabled extension for bright students to secondary
school since 1902, but it was not until 1972 that this extension became
e¤ective for all. The coincidence between this change and the sharp rise in
mobility adds another empirical support to our model.
Another example of measuring changes in mobility over time is supplied
by Guell et al (2006), who measure intergenerational mobility in Catalonia
by studying surnames. They compare people above and below the age of fty
and nd that mobility in the current generation is lower than in the previous
generation. Interestingly the skilled to unskilled wage ratio for the older
generation were close to 2, while for the younger generation it is 1.56. Thus
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both mobility and inequality went down, pointing in the direction of changes
in labor market institutions. Indeed, Spain went through a signicant change
thirty years ago with the death of Franco. While before his death labor
unions were not allowed and labor markets were not regulated, after his
death labor market regained much importance and labor market policies
became more similar to other Southern European countries. Hence, Spain
went through a major increase in wage compression. The expected e¤ect of
such a change on inequality and mobility according to our model is indeed
in line with the results of Guell et al (2006).
Another phenomenon that our analysis can shed light on is the rise of
wage inequality in the US in recent decades. The main explanation to this
increase has been skill-biased technical change, but there have been other
explanations as well. Our model claims that if this widening of the wage
gap is a result of SBTC, then it should be accompanied with an increase in
intergenerational mobility as well. Indeed Mayer and Lopoo (2001) nd ev-
idence in PSID data that intergenerational mobility is higher for individuals
born after 1953. Thus, although a small sample size and the di¢ culty to
measure lifetime income make this nding somewhat preliminary, it clearly
supports our models predictions. A skill biased technical change increases
both inequality and mobility.
7 Conclusions
This paper presents a simple theoretical model that analyzes the joint deter-
mination of income inequality, skill distribution and intergenerational mo-
bility. Its main focus is on the expected correlation between inequality and
mobility. Empirical studies have shown that this correlation across countries
can be either positive or negative. Our paper gives a simple explanation to
these ndings. We show that the correlation between inequality and mobil-
ity is positive if the underlying di¤erences are in the production sector, while
the correlation is negative if the underlying changes are in the education sec-
tor. In the empirical section of the paper, we review results supporting the
predictions of our model and we therefore believe it helps in understanding
observed di¤erences in inequality across countries, and also over time in a
single country.
Our model can be used to examine additional economic, social and cul-
tural variables. For example, the analysis of the case of missing information
in the appendix shows, that countries, in which parents are more domi-
nant within the family, tend to have less education, less mobility and higher
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inequality. We believe that the framework presented here can be further
extended in many other interesting directions.
Finally, we have shown that public subsidies to education may be par-
ticularly benecial for unskilled individuals. It is tempting to interpret this
result as saying that unskilled voters should be expected to vote in favor of
educational subsidies. However, it may be premature to draw such a con-
clusion. First, we analyze steady states and the inequality reducing e¤ect
of educational subsides occurs with a substantial lag since it takes time for
the relative supplies of skilled and non-skilled to change after an educational
reform. Second, we have analyzed the consequences of a permanent change
in the subsidy rate, while political decisions may be better modeled as taken
without commitment. We leave the study of the dynamic political determi-
nation of educational subsidies in a model with endogenous wage formation
for future work.
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Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1.
We can rewrite (8) as:
h

I   1
b

  1


(  ln (1 m)) + ln I = h

I   1
b

m (A.1)
The RHS of (A.1) is a linear increasing function of m while the LHS is
going from ln I to1 (or 1) and is increasing and convex (decreasing and
concave) if h
 
I   1b
  1 is larger (smaller) than zero. Hence, there can be
at most two solutions to (A.1). We show below that the smallest solution,
denoted m (I) ; is the relevant one since the larger implies es > 1:
We begin the analysis with I = 1: In this case m = 0 is a solution. If
h
 
I   1b
  1  0; a unique solution clearly exists for any I  1:
Now consider the alternative case, h
 
I   1b
  1 > 0: Note that the LHS
has a strictly smaller derivative with respect to m at m = 0: Therefore,
continuity ensures that a solution remains for I > 1 in a neighborhood of 1:
For a su¢ ciently high level of inequality no solution exists. The maximum
level of inequality for which a solution exists is I where the solution m
occurs at the tangency of the LHS and the RHS, namely at
m = m (I) =
1
h
 
I   1b
 :
Hence, for I < I; at least one solution exists, that is m (I) exists in the
range I 2 [1; I] : Next, we show that the smallest solution m (I) is the only
solution to (A.1) such that es  1. To see this, note that if there are two
intersection points to the two sides of (A.1), then in between them, there is
a point mp, where the two curves have the same slope, given by
mp =
1
h
 
I   1b
 ;
where we note that mp < 1 when h
 
I   1b
   1 > 0: If there were two
solutions to (A.1), then in one m > mp. Then
es = mhI > mphI =
I

 
I   1b
  1:
We next analyze the slope of the function m(I). First, note that the
LHS (A.1) must cut the RHS from above at m = m (I) : Second, a higher
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I raises both the LHS and the RHS of (A.1). But since   ln (1 m) > m,
the LHS rises by more than the RHS. Therefore, an increase in I must lead
to higher m; i.e., m0 (I) > 0:
Finally, implicitly dene Imax from
m (Imax)hImax = 1;
i.e., as the highest level of inequality such that es is no larger than unity.
To conclude the proof, we must show that Imax  I: Now, at I, we have
m (I)hI =
I

 
I   1b
 > 1:
Since m (I)hI is increasing in I; I > Imax
Proof of proposition 3:
Using, the denition of es and en, solving for m; and substituting in (8),
yields
X    ln I 

h

I   1
b

  1


  ln(1  b
h (I + Ib)
)

+h

I   1
b

b
h (I + Ib)

= 0:
From this we can calculate
dI
db
=  
dX
db
dX
dI
where
dX
dI
=  1
I
+ h

ln(1  b
h (I + Ib)
)

+

h

I   1
b

  1

 b(I 1+b)
h(I+Ib)2
(1  bh(I+Ib))
+h

b
h (I + Ib)

  h

I   1
b

b
 
I 1 + b

h (I + Ib)2
= hm  1
I
  h (  ln(1 m))
 

m
1 m

1

  hm

I   1
b
  
I 1 + b

I (I 1 + b)
=  1  es
I
  h (  ln(1 m))
 

m
1 m

1

  (es   en)
  
I 1 + b

I (I 1 + b)
< 0
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and
dX
db
=
h
b2

ln(1  b
h (I + Ib)
)

 

h

I   1
b

  1

 I
h(I+Ib)2
1  bh(I+Ib)
+
h
b2

b
h (I + Ib)

+ h

I   1
b

I
h (I + Ib)2
=
h
b2
(ln(1 m)) + h
b2
m+
1
1 m
m
b

1

  (es   en)

I
I + Ib
=
h
b2 (1 m)

(1 m) ln(1 m) +m+m2

1

  (es   en)

I

>
=
h
b2 (1 m) ((1 m) ln(1 m) +m) > 0 8m > 0
To see the latter, note that
lim
m!0
((1 m) ln(1 m) +m) = 0
and
d ((1 m) ln(1 m) +m)
dm
=   ln (1 m) > 0:
Appendix 2: Unknown Inaptitude
In the benchmark model we assume that inaptitude of child is already
known when education decision is made. In this appendix we explore the
possibility that inaptitude is unknown at the time of this decision. While
the main results of the paper still hold, one important new issue emerges.
Under missing information parents and children bargain over the amount of
investment in education, and it therefore depends on their relative bargain-
ing strengths. This opens a discussion on the e¤ect of di¤erences in social
and cultural norms on inequality and mobility.
Assume that the amount of education is decided before inaptitude is
known. When education begins, the child immediately observes whether
she can nish school or not, namely whether e is below or above the amount
of education purchased. If she can, she remains in school, and if not she
leaves school and the parents get their money back. Note that under these
informational assumptions, the o¤spring can bargain with the parent on the
size of investment in education, threatening not to go to school if the amount
is not high enough. The underlying conict reects the di¤erent interests of
parents and children. While the latter always want to have more education,
to raise probability of success, parents share this desire, but also care about
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own consumption. This conict of interests is resolved in bargaining. We
assume that parent and o¤spring use a simple form of asymmetric Nash
bargaining.
The expected utility of parents at time of bargaining is:
lnwj + Vn + ej [ln (1 mj) +  (Vs   Vn)]
where j = s if skilled and n if unskilled. The threshold levels are: es = msIh
and en = mnh=b.
The expected utility of children to parents of type j is:
Vn + ej (Vs   Vn)
The threat points are lnwj+Vn and Vn for parent and child respectively,
and if the relative bargaining power of parents is denoted by q, the logarithm
of the asymmetric Nash-product is
ln ej + q ln [ln (1 mj) +  (Vs   Vn)] + (1  q) ln (Vs   Vn) :
Substituting the threshold levels and maximizing yields that skilled and
unskilled spend the same share of income m on education, which is deter-
mined by:
 (Vs   Vn) + q m
1 m   ln (1 m) : (A.2)
We see that a higher bargaining power to parents q, reduces the share
of income that goes to education m. While (A.2) is the new incentive curve
in this extension, the gains curve is the same as in the benchmark model.
Calculating the two relations together yields the function m
  ln (1 m)

+
qm
1 m

1

  h

I   1
b

m

(A.3)
= ln (I) + h

I   1
b

[  ln (1 m) m] :
Note that (A.3) is similar to the equilibrium condition (8), except for the
element that depends on q. The other equilibrium conditions are derived
as in the benchmark model. Clearly, the main results of the paper remain
intact. The only novelty here is the new variable q, the bargaining power of
parents. As the LHS of (A.3) increases with q, it leads to a downward shift
of m and of the M curve, while the L curve remains unchanged. Intuitively,
when parents have more bargaining power over their children, they consume
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more and pay less for their education. Hence, upward mobility decreases and
inequality increases. Thus, the social power of parents within the family can
be another potential explanation for high inequality and low mobility.
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